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Governance and Growth in Sub-Saharan
Africa
Benno J. Ndulu and Stephen A. O’Connell
R eal income per head in much of sub-Saharan Africa grew rapidly in the1960s, but faltered following the first OPEC oil price shock in 1973–74,and then stagnated or fell from the late 1970s to the early 1990s. Africa
also saw a broad wave of authoritarian rule sweep the continent in the 1960s and
early 1970s. Since 1990, however, the African political landscape has experienced
significant changes, many in the direction of greater pluralism and democracy.
Moreover, where civil strife has been avoided, Africa has seen a broad tendency
towards rapid growth for several years after 1995.
This sequence of events suggests that political economy may offer useful
perspectives on Africa’s growth record over the last several decades. We begin with
a summary of Africa’s growth patterns and the evolution of African political
regimes. We then examine models of authoritarian rule for insights into the
conditions under which elites may sacrifice the general interest to extract rents and
retain power, or in which leaders may find ways of making growth-enhancing policy
politically acceptable. It would be premature to conclude that Africa’s political
reforms of the 1990s have helped to generate economic progress. However, we
do believe that the increase in political pluralism, in combination with greater
unity among African aid donors, bodes well for a continuation of Africa’s growth
recovery.
y Benno J. Ndulu is Lead Specialist, World Bank Resident Mission, Dar es Salaam,
Tanzania. Stephen A. O’Connell is Professor of Economics, Swarthmore College, Swarthmore,
Pennsylvania. Both authors are also Research Associates, Centre for Study of African
Economies, University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom.
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The Growth Record
African countries were poor in 1960. They were largely pre-capitalist, at least
outside of narrow corridors of development that served a commodity export sector,
and the production sector was dominated by peasant agriculture using traditional
methods. Most were acutely lacking in human capital. Yet in the move to indepen-
dence at that time, optimism was widespread. National development plans envi-
sioned rapid growth, fueled by industrial expansion, diversification of exports,
modernization of agriculture, and public investment in health and education.
Looking back, the legacy has been mainly one of disappointment. In the vast
majority of cases, growth had faltered seriously by the early 1980s. Social indicators
like literacy rates and life expectancy typically fared better, but even these came
under pressure in the economic contractions of the 1980s and early 1990s.
Figure 1 shows the evolution of real GDP per capita for 39 of the 47 countries
of sub-Saharan Africa from 1960 to 1997 (these 39 account for over 90 percent of
total sub-Saharan GDP). The data are at international prices from 1960 to at least
1988; for most countries, the international price data extend to 1992. We have
extended these series to 1997 using IMF data on growth rates of GDP as expressed
in constant local currency. The difference between population-weighted and un-
weighted figures largely reflects the roller-coaster performance of Nigeria, a coun-
try accounting for nearly 25 percent of sub-Saharan population.
The underlying data for individual countries follow a few characteristic pat-
terns, as emphasized by Pritchett (1998). Growth is rapid and sustained in a small
number of cases, most notably Botswana and Mauritius, and steadily negative in a
few others, like Benin, Chad and Madagascar. But the typical pattern—as reflected
in the average—is one of initial growth followed by protracted stagnation or
decline. The dates at which growth stops or reverses for individual countries cluster
between 1972 and 1982. Among the slowest growers, roughly half exhibit reason-
ably robust growth before entering the period of stagnation or decline; the other
half grow at rates below 1.5 percent in both periods and are better described as
persistently stagnating.
Figure 2 also shows the smoothed difference between the average annual
growth rate in 43 non-African developing countries (mainly in Asia and Latin
America) and in the African sample. The average growth differential is 1.5 per-
centage points per year. The differential approaches zero briefly in the late 1960s
and again in the early 1980s, but is strictly positive except at the very end of the
sample. Growth decelerated in much of the developing world after 1973, so that
Africa’s slowdown and outright decline becomes “unusual” in terms of relative
growth rates only in the late 1980s and early 1990s. There is evidence of a general
turnaround starting in roughly 1994. Indeed, with the slowdown in growth in Asia
since 1997, more recent data would almost certainly show Africa outperforming the
comparison countries.
In Tables 1 and 2, we decompose the growth in GDP per worker into growth
in capital per worker and a productivity residual, for the period from 1960 to 1994.
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Regional aggregates cover 21 of the 39 countries of sub-Saharan Africa represented
in Figure 1 (representing roughly 85 percent of sub-Saharan GDP and population),
and 45 other developing countries. Table 1 presents unweighted averages of
endpoint-to-endpoint growth rates across countries, while Table 2 presents stan-
dard deviations. We stress three features of the data.
First, Africa’s long-term growth has been very slow relative to that of other
developing countries. Over the 34-year period of the sample, the difference is on
the order of 2 1⁄2 percentage points per year.1 This gap is more than sufficient to
double the income ratio between a country growing at African rates and one
growing at the rate of other developing countries over the 34-year period.2 Real
incomes per person have been diverging even more rapidly, at 3 percentage points
1 The discrepancy between the 1960–94 growth differential in Table 1 and the average differential in
Figure 2 is due to the use of different data series, the inclusion of 1995–97 in Figure 2, the use of
endpoint-to-endpoint growth rates in Table 1, and differences in the sample (for example, Table 1
includes Ethiopia, Sierra Leone, and Sudan, three very low-growth African countries that do not appear
in Figure 2).
2 Cross-country growth regressions typically find that roughly 1 percentage point of Africa’s annual
growth shortfall remains after conditioning on a stable of explanatory variables (Collier and Gunning,
Figure 1
Real GDP per Capita, Sub-Saharan Africa
Notes: The population-weighted figure is total GDP in the 39 countries divided by total population,
year by year. The unweighted figure is an unweighted average of national per capita incomes. The
following countries are included: Angola, Be´nin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape
Verde Islands, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Coˆte d’Ivoire, Gabon, Gambia,
Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius,
Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland,
Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zaire, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Eight countries were excluded due to
incomplete data on the post-1988 period: Djibouti, Ethiopia, Equatorial Guinea, Liberia, Sa˜o Tome´,
Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Sudan.
Sources: Penn World Tables version 5.6 for 1960–92, where available; data after 1988 extended using
growth rates of real GDP per capita from IMF, World Economic Outlook, December 1998 and
population data from World Bank, World Development Indicators 1998.
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per year, than the growth in GDP per worker shown in Table 1. This is because
Africa’s economies, alone among the regions of the world, have experienced a
falling ratio of labor force to total population over the last few decades, driven by
a combination of continued high fertility rates with reductions in infant and child
mortality (Bloom and Sachs, 1998).
A second key feature of the data is that while a third of Africa’s growth shortfall
reflects slower accumulation of physical and human capital than in the other
developing countries, fully two-thirds is accounted for by slower growth in the
residual, which in a very broad sense is often taken to represent developments in
technology.
A third feature of the data, especially apparent from Table 2, is that while
the shocks of the 1970s had disparate impacts outside of the region, the African
sample shows a tendency to converge on poor performance after 1973. Africa is




Notes: The figure gives the smoothed difference between unweighted average growth rates of real
GDP per capita in 43 developing countries outside of sub-Saharan Africa and 39 countries of sub-
Saharan Africa. Smoothing is with a three-year centered moving average. The sub-Saharan African
countries are listed in the note to Table 1. The comparison group of 43 other developing countries
includes 22 from Latin America and the Caribbean (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras,
Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and
Venezuela), nine from East Asia (China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines,
Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand), five from South Asia (Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Pakistan, and
Sri Lanka), and seven others (Iran, Israel, Jordan, Papua New Guinea, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and
Turkey).
Sources: see Figure 1.
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in fact the only region of the developing world within which both the mean and
the standard deviation of growth rates fell after 1973. A distinctive feature of
Africa’s post-1973 experience is a collapse in physical capital accumulation,
which goes nearly to zero in the 1973–94 period (and is actually negative for
1984 –94). This is in marked contrast with other developing countries, where
investment tends to rise.
Political Regimes
Following independence, African political regimes tended to evolve in three
stages: consolidation of authoritarian rule by the mid-1970s, crisis management
under authoritarian rule to the late 1980s, and an outburst of democratization
starting in 1990. The political economy literature has therefore viewed Africa’s
growth performance through the lens of authoritarian rule, and we will follow suit
Table 1












1960–94 0.39 0.60 0.23 20.44
1960–73 1.76 1.05 0.18 0.53
1973–94 20.44 0.33 0.26 21.02
45 Other developing
countriesc
1960–94 3.14 1.44 0.33 1.34
1960–73 2.07 1.19 0.39 0.46
1973–94 1.65 1.45 0.49 20.30
Notes:
a The production function is assumed to be Cobb-Douglas in physical capital and effective labor, where
effective labor is the product of education per worker and total employment. Capital’s share is assumed
to be 0.35. See Collins and Bosworth (1996).
b Cameroon, Coˆte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique,
Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zaire, Zambia, and
Zimbabwe. Of these, Ethiopia, Sierra Leone, and Sudan do not appear in Figures 1 and 2.
c This group includes eight countries from East Asia (China, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines,
Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand), five from South Asia (Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Sri
Lanka), 22 from Latin America and the Caribbean (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa
Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, El Salvador, Haiti, Jamaica, Mex-
ico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela), and ten
others (Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Malta, Morocco, Tunisia, and Turkey).
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from Collins and Bosworth (1996).
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below. The historical context is important, however, so we begin with a brief
overview.3
In historical perspective, the most striking feature of African states is their
novelty. The contemporary African political map was largely determined in the late
19th century “scramble for Africa.” Ground rules were formalized at the Berlin
Conference of 1884–85, where European powers agreed to recognize each others’
territorial claims based on effective control of the coast. The process was complete
by 1914 and the resulting territorial borders were largely adopted at independence.
As late as 1939, only Ethiopia, Liberia and South Africa existed as independent
nations; elsewhere in Africa, European colonial control was essentially unchal-
lenged. Outside of the Belgian territories of the Congo (later Zaire) and Ruanda-
Urundi (later Rwanda and Burundi), the bulk of the continent was in French and
British hands. The French territories were administered federally, in the vast blocs
of French West and Central Africa, an administrative geography that was to survive
independence in the form of two multi-country monetary unions with currencies
linked to the French franc. British territories were more dispersed geographically,
and the British tradition of indirect colonial governance was less centralizing than
the French.
World War II spelled the end of European colonialism. The United States and
Russia supported decolonization, and Europe was exhausted; indeed, even before
the end of the war the British and American governments had confidentially agreed
3 Griffiths (1994) is an excellent general reference. We draw also on Oliver and Atmore (1994) for
historical background, Ruth Collier (1982), Sandbrook (1985), and Fieldhouse (1986) for the transition
to independence and the consolidation of authoritarian rule (1945–80), and Bratton and van de Walle
(1997) for subsequent political developments including regime transitions in the 1990s.
Table 2












1960–94 0.97 0.61 0.12 0.97
1960–73 1.66 0.92 0.13 1.69
1973–94 1.33 0.68 0.15 1.22
Other developing countries
(45 countries)
1960–94 1.64 1.05 0.20 1.04
1960–73 1.84 0.87 0.14 1.20
1973–94 2.80 1.07 0.21 2.17
Notes: A list of countries appears in the note to Table 1.
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from Collins and Bosworth (1996).
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that Europe’s African colonies would be ready for independence by the end of the
20th century (Oliver and Atmore, 1994). But events moved much faster. India’s
independence came in 1947; Indonesia’s (from the Dutch) in 1951; and in 1956,
long-deteriorating relations between Britain and Egypt led both nations to accom-
modate Sudan’s independence from the “Anglo-Egyptian condominium.” In the
same year, Egypt’s General Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, leading to the
humiliation of Britain and France whose military attempt to occupy the canal zone
failed, having been actively opposed by both the United States and the Soviet
Union. The clock accelerated, and in the end Africa’s move to independence was
abrupt. Between 1956 and 1968, 34 former colonies and protectorates of Great
Britain, France and Belgium, representing two-thirds of the continent’s GDP and
three-fourths of its population, became independent nations. France divested of its
colonies en masse, with 13 receiving independence in 1960. Among British colo-
nies, the move to independence was more tailored to individual circumstances, but
by 1968 only Southern Rhodesia (later Zimbabwe) remained in British hands, its
own transition blocked by the “unilateral declaration of independence” of the
white settler regime of Ian Smith. An internal war culminated in Zimbabwe’s
independence in 1980. Portugal’s dictatorship resisted decolonization and its
colonies of Angola and Mozambique became independent only with the Portu-
guese revolution of 1974. In 1994, events at two ends of the continent—Eritrea’s
emergence from a 30-year war of independence from Ethiopia and the transition
to majority rule in South Africa—culminated a process that had brought political
independence to the 47 countries of sub-Saharan Africa in fewer than 40 years, and
to most of them in much less than a generation.
Africa’s formal political institutions were young at independence, and most
countries lacked a tradition of mass political participation. After 1945, the
European powers moved deliberately and then rapidly to introduce universal
suffrage (R. Collier, 1982). Political constitutions at the time of independence
were modeled on their European counterparts, with British colonies inheriting
parliamentary systems and French colonies republican ones with stronger ex-
ecutive positions. On paper, these institutions built in substantial pluralism and
political liberties. But they were not to last. By 1975, and in a number of cases
even before independence, nearly all African political regimes had cast off the
trappings of pluralism and replaced them with authoritarian structures. Along
with a narrowing of political participation, many governments acted to subor-
dinate domestic “agencies of restraint” to executive authority by the late 1970s
(P. Collier, 1991). For example, colonial-era currency boards were often re-
placed with national central banks that then became effectively subordinate to
finance ministries within the government.
By 1988, only five countries in sub-Saharan Africa—Botswana, Gambia, Mau-
ritius, Senegal, and Zimbabwe—had multi-party systems allowing meaningful po-
litical competition at the national level. Among the remaining 42 nations, Bratton
and van de Walle (1997) identify eleven “military oligarchies,” 16 “plebiscitary
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one-party systems,” 13 “competitive one-party systems,” and two “settler oligarchies”
(Namibia and South Africa).4
The military oligarchies included continually war-torn countries like Liberia
and Sudan and also countries like Ghana and Uganda that were ruled by military
leaders who had acquired power via coups and presided over successful macroeco-
nomic stabilization in the 1980s. These regimes imposed relatively tight constraints
on mass political participation.
One-party systems are distinguished in this classification by the level of political
competition. In the 16 “plebiscitary” one-party systems, themselves often led by
military leaders, mass participation was encouraged via mechanisms designed to
ratify the nonnegotiable candidates and platform of the national party. This diverse
group included the predatory regime of Mobutu’s Zaire (now the Democratic
Republic of Congo) and also Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Somalia, where
the strategic interests of the Cold War powers involved them directly or indirectly
in the military contests for power after 1974. This group also included Kenya, where
President Moi introduced public queuing for local elections in 1986, thus violating
secrecy of the ballot and undermining a tradition of intense competition in local
elections.
In the 13 “competitive” one-party systems, local and parliamentary elections
were meaningfully contested, but in a framework of single-party dominance and
with no effective contestibility at the executive level. Ruth Collier (1982)
characterizes these regimes as having achieved dominance via legal means by
the time of independence or soon thereafter. Such regimes were often charac-
terized by long executive tenure. The canonical example is Coˆte d’Ivoire, where
the rural-based Parti De´mocratique de Coˆte d’Ivoire, formed in 1946 by Fe´lix
Houghouet-Boigny, so dominated national elections that a transition to one-
party rule effectively predated independence. Houghouet-Boigny was elected
president at independence in 1960, and subsequently won an average percent-
age of 99.7 percent of the vote in five consecutive presidential elections, a
record that survived more than a decade of economic contraction starting in
1980. The remaining 12 regimes in this group had an average of 3½ presidential
elections between independence and 1989, in which the party’s candidate won
an average of 93 percent of the vote (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997, Table 1).
Local and parliamentary elections were often contested hotly, so that the
position of incumbents below the executive was by no means secure; but
opposition parties were illegal or easily undermined, and dominance of the
national legislature was assured. This group of nations includes the Tanzania of
Julius Nyerere and his chosen successor, Hassan Mwinyi (Nyerere resigned
voluntarily in 1985 but retained leadership of the party until 1990), the Zambia
of Kenneth Kaunda, the Malawi of Hastings Banda, and the Cameroon of
Amhadou Ahidjo and his chosen successor Paul Biya.
4 The full list of countries in each category appears in the note to Figure 3.
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The political landscape began to change decidedly in the late 1980s. Between
1988 and 1992, in most cases following domestic political protest, 33 of Africa’s 42
nondemocratic regimes had measurably increased civil liberties. By 1994, 16 of
these countries had held genuine multi-party elections, making the continent a
major participant in what Huntington (1991) has characterized as the “third wave”
of democratization in the modern world. In addition to the 16 countries which had
held such elections, an additional 12 countries saw “flawed” transitions (the clas-
sification of transitions is due to Bratton and van de Walle, 1997), as in Ghana and
Kenya where multi-party elections had been held but manipulated by the elites in
power; and 12 more countries saw transition effectively “blocked” (at least as of
1994) by the elite, as in Nigeria where a national election was openly contested in
1993 but then annulled by the military. The latter group included Tanzania, where
an open national election was soon to occur. Only in Sudan and Liberia, engaged
in civil wars of long standing, did the issue of a democratic transition appear to be
fully off the national agenda.
What forces drove African political systems to authoritarian regimes? Ruth
Collier (1982) argues that leaders sought to deny the benefits of mass political
support to contesting elites. The prospect of personal aggrandizement was substan-
tial, but its initial role is easily overplayed: leaders like Machel (Mozambique),
Senghor (Senegal) and Nyerere (Tanzania) clearly sought power, but not spoils.
Across the board, Africa’s first generation of leaders appealed to the national
interest in stability and economic development. They argued that competitive
national politics would hold the national development agenda hostage to sub-
national interests based on ethnicity, region, religion or class. The argument takes
for granted that economic development was a state project, about which there is
more below. But an appeal to the dangers of factional conflict was not implausible.
The colonial authorities had adjudicated local (and cross-border) conflicts, and
their exit widened the scope for such conflicts. Internal conflicts that had sim-
mered under colonialism emerged to violent effect in Ethiopia, Nigeria, Sudan,
Uganda, and Zaire, and later in Angola and Mozambique, all within a decade of
independence.
The salience of tribal and ethnic divisions at independence was in part a
legacy of colonialism. The European-created national boundaries in many cases
bore little relation to pre-existing economic or political groupings. More sig-
nificantly, the colonial powers had in some cases acted to reinforce ethnic
identities, as in the British system of “indirect rule” in Nigeria and the Belgian
government’s alliance with the Tutsi minority in Rwanda and Burundi. But the
traditionally local scale of economic and political activity in Africa virtually
guaranteed that in any case local identities would predominate over national
ones at the time of independence. In this sense, it was the existence of national
borders, rather than their placement, that gave rise to a political management
problem. We therefore find it difficult to follow Griffiths (1994) and others in
second-guessing the 1964 agreement by African states to treat the boundaries
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existing at independence as permanent.5 We return below to the substantial
challenges social divisions pose to economic policy.
A final perspective on the transition to authoritarian rule comes from the
“Lipset hypothesis,” which views a relatively advanced level of economic develop-
ment as a prerequisite for democracy (Lipset, 1959). The argument is that demo-
cratic institutions are consistent with political stability only where relatively high
incomes and widespread literacy support a tradition of informed participation by a
wide electorate. Such conditions were generally absent at Africa’s independence.
Using the comparison groups in Figure 2, Africa’s (unweighted) real GDP per
capita was less than half that of other developing countries in 1960. Life expectancy
at birth was 40 years in 1960, as compared with 53 years among other developing
countries. In 1970, the adult literacy rate was 26 percent, as compared with 61
percent in the comparison group.6
Figure 3 brings out the potential importance of initial conditions in explaining
the variation of political regimes even within Africa.7 We group countries according
to the tripartite division used in Bratton and van de Walle (1997), leaving out the
“settler oligarchies” of Namibia and South Africa, whose transition to black majority
rule had not yet occurred. The classification applies to 1988; with few exceptions,
it had been established by the mid-1970s. The five nations with multiparty systems
are shown by hollow circles. At this level of aggregation, the Lipset hypothesis is a
striking feature of Africa’s first generation of independence: the multi-party systems
started richer and expanded their advantage over time. One-party systems, whether
competitive or plebiscitary, are shown by the line with the hollow boxes. After a
mildly encouraging growth performance in the 1960s, their real GDP per capita
barely rose over the next 25 years. Finally, the triangles show the military oligar-
chies, which started as the poorest group of nations, and despite some growth
during the 1970s, have remained the poorest.
The causal linkages underlying Figure 3 have only begun to be addressed in
the empirical literature. However, even in their undigested form, these data pose
two central questions about Africa’s recent democratization: Will it last? Will it
5 The scope for post-independence border adjustments was explicitly limited by action of the Organi-
zation of African Unity in 1964 (as quoted in Griffiths, 1994, p. 68): “Considering that border problems
constitute a grave and permanent factor of dissention . . . all Member States pledge themselves to respect
the borders existing on their achievement of national independence.” Our own view is that ethnic
homogeneity held no better promise for the conceptualization of viable national political units in Africa
at the time of independence than it has elsewhere during this century, or than it does now in
Africa—witness the conflict in ethnically homogeneous Somalia.
6 The comparison excludes Namibia and South Africa, and the life expectancy and literacy comparisons
use reduced samples due to limited data. When population-weighted averages are used (reducing the
influence of China and India), Africa’s real GDP per capita rises to 71 percent of the comparison group,
the life expectancy comparison is 40 vs. 47 years; and the adult literacy comparison is 23 vs. 27 years. Data
are from the United Nations Development Programme (1996).
7 The Lipset hypothesis has received support in recent cross-country empirical work by Barro (1996) and
Gasiorowski and Power (1998).
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make a difference for growth? We will return to these questions, but first we offer
an analytic framework for understanding the choices made by various regimes.
Policy Choices
In their public pronouncements, Africa’s first-generation leaders often ap-
peared to differ dramatically from one another in the role they envisioned for
private accumulation in the development process. But as emphasized by Young
(1982) and others, these differences hid powerful commonalities in the policy
environment they desired. We emphasize two such features.
First, governments of seemingly disparate ideology shared the development
paradigm of the day, which emphasized the importance of market failures and the
Figure 3
Real GDP per Capita by Political Regime
Notes: Bratton and van de Walle (1997) classify the 47 countries of sub-Saharan Africa according to
their political regime in 1988. Omitting the “settler oligarchies” of Namibia and South Africa, this
leaves 45 countries, of which we have data for 37. The groups are shown below, with excluded
countries shown in brackets. We have joined Plebiscitary and Competitive One-Party Systems into a
single category comprising 23 countries. The figure shows unweighted averages of real GDP per
capita for each category. Population-weighted averages look similar, though the one-party states and
particularly the military oligarchies show a more pronounced rise and fall, with the military
oligarchies outperforming the one-party states starting in 1974 (reflecting Nigeria’s rise).
Five Multi-Party Systems: Botswana, Gambia, Mauritius, Senegal, Zimbabwe.
Nine Military Oligarchies: Burkina Faso, Burundi, Chad, Ghana, Guinea, Lesotho, [Liberia,]
Mauritania, Nigeria [Sudan] and Uganda.
Twelve Plebiscitary One-Party Systems: Angola, Benin, Cape Verde, Comoros, Congo, [Djibouti,
Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia,] Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Mozambique, Niger, [Somalia,]
Swaziland, and Zaire.
Eleven Competitive One-Party Systems: Cameroon, Central African Republic, Coˆte d’Ivoire,
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Rwanda, [Sa˜o Tome´,] Seychelles, [Sierra Leone,] Tanzania, Togo, Zambia.
Sources: Regime classification from Bratton and van de Walle (1997). Real GDP per capita from Penn
World Tables version 5.6, extended as described in the note to Figure 1.
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need for state-led industrialization. The dominant peasant agricultural economy
was considered not only technologically backward, but also lacking the requisite
dynamism for autonomous development. The state was to use its fiscal powers,
external resources channeled through the state, and controls on private sector
resource allocation to modernize the economy.
Second, trade and investment policies were inward-looking. This orientation
was rooted in an obligation to repudiate the colonial division of labor and to
develop national managerial capacity and comparative advantage in industry. Thus,
domestic industry enjoyed high rates of effective protection and grew rapidly in
many countries during the 1960s and early 1970s. But outside of Mauritius, which
developed a dynamic textile export sector, the industrialization process did not
survive the economic shocks of the 1970s.
Suspending the wisdom of hindsight, the choice of state-led and inward-
looking strategies can be made plausible through an appeal to a combination of
initial conditions (including new nationhood) and the global intellectual environ-
ment of the time. Gerschenkron wrote in 1962 of “The Advantages of Backward-
ness,” offering the notion that where the historical preconditions for capitalist
development were absent, governments could shortcut the modernization process
by substituting direct intervention.
The policy environment in Africa came under intense external scrutiny starting in
1980. African governments, hoping to rally the World Bank in support of a renewed
industrialization effort, requested a report on the challenges facing industrialization in
Africa. The Organization of African Unity, in its 1980 Lagos Plan of Action (OAU, 1981),
had emphasized the impact of external shocks and the need for government interven-
tion to overcome structural impediments to long-run development. The Bank’s report,
in contrast, developed a systematic critique of African economic policy (World Bank,
1981). We explore the essence of this critique below. Here we simply observe that the
Berg Report, as it was called, crystallized an ongoing shift in which donors came to view
Africa’s policy failures as mainly to blame for slow growth. Foreign assistance was
reconfigured with a view to obtaining economic reform, under the rubric of “structural
adjustment.” Reforms in the 1980s emphasized exchange rate unification, trade liber-
alization, liberalization of agricultural marketing, and fiscal contraction. Beginning in
the late 1980s, a second generation of adjustment packages began to emphasize the
reform of public sector institutions, including privatization of state enterprises. The
implications of these developments continue to dominate economic policymaking in
most African countries.
Neopatrimonial Rule and Governance
An extensive political economy literature locates slow African growth in a
failure of governance. Lipumba (1994, p. 88) phrased the central question in this
way: “Can African governments establish ‘developmental states’ that respect their
budget constraints, allocate resources, pursue policies that develop human re-
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sources, and encourage private-sector saving and investment to generate productive
employment and promote growth?” The notion that good governance can spur
economic growth was also put forward in 1755 by Adam Smith, who listed as key
factors the triumvirate of “peace, easy taxes, and tolerable administration of jus-
tice.”8 The cross-country literature on economic growth has found that various
proxies for these three factors are correlated with growth, and also that African
governments have rarely achieved all three (Collier and Gunning, 1999).
The political economy literature has stressed the “neopatrimonial” features of
African authoritarian regimes. The term refers to the lingering influence, within
modern state structures, of personalized patterns of authority and obligation,
patterns that Max Weber associated with socio-political organization in the smallest
and most traditional political units (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997). Two central
themes emerge from this literature. The first explains how an overly narrow
leadership elite can end up over-taxing dynamic sectors of the economy. The
second theme involves a tendency of the neopatrimonial state to exacerbate the
transactions costs facing private economic activity. We develop these two themes
in turn.
The Unconstrained Elite
An important strand in the political economy literature—and the current
thinking of external aid agencies—locates the poor public policy performance of
African countries in a divergence of interest between African leaders and their own
populations. Bates (1981) offered a classic treatment of this theme in an analysis of
post-independence agricultural policy in eight African countries, and later wrote
(1983, p. 165):
Leaders engage in bureaucratic accumulation and act so as to enhance the
wealth and power of those who derive their incomes from the public sector;
they also act on behalf of private factions, be they social classes, military
cliques, or ethnic groups. They engage in economic redistribution, often
from the poor to the rich and at the expense of economic growth. These are
the central themes in policy formation in Africa and their prominence serves
to discredit any approach based on a conviction that governments are agents
of the public interest.
To convey some implications of this approach, suppose that elites in power
serve the interests of a group that comprises a fraction f of the population. We
assume that the identity of this group is given by pre-existing political and social
dynamics. Tax revenues are split between infrastructure spending and transfers to
8 “Little else is requisite to carry a state to the highest degree of opulence from the lowest barbarism, but
peace, easy taxes, and tolerable administration of justice; all the rest being brought about by the natural
course of things,” wrote Adam Smith. Jay (1996) traces this 1755 statement to Smith’s Essays on
Philosophical Subjects (1795).
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the favored group. Denoting infrastructure spending per capita by I and the tax
base per capita by B, the government’s period-by-period budget constraint (assum-
ing no borrowing or aid) is
f T 1 I 5 tB~t!,
where t is the tax rate and T is the transfer received by each member of the favored
group.9 The tax base should be conceived of as narrow relative to overall economic
activity, which is a realistic assumption for developing economies. Goods traded
with industrial countries, for example, provide a disproportionately important
share of revenue in most African countries because they are easily taxed as they pass
through railways and ports. Broad-based employment or income taxes are unavail-
able, given the small size of the formal sector.10
Taxation is distortionary; that is, a rise in t shrinks the tax base B(t) and creates
a deadweight loss. Holding infrastructure constant, the efficiency effects of antici-
pated future taxes operate through the level and composition of private investment
(Adam and O’Connell, 1999). Private capital accumulation does not necessarily fall
with increases in the anticipated tax rate, but the composition of investment shifts
away from readily taxable forms—towards capital flight in preference to domestic
investment, mobile capital in preference to fixed capital, and investment in infor-
mal and/or illegal circuits as opposed to formal and legal ones. Such shifts in the
composition of investment reduce growth and would show up in a growth decom-
position as a decreasing or even negative productivity residual. Public infrastructure
complements and increases the productivity of private capital, so higher infrastruc-
ture means higher output, both directly and via higher private investment. This
brings out a second tradeoff between transfers and growth: holding the tax rate
constant, higher transfers mean less infrastructure and therefore less growth.
We focus on the choice of tax rate and transfers, holding infrastructure
constant.11 As long as infrastructure spending is positive, which implies that some
amount of distortionary taxation cannot be avoided, then even the smallest of
transfers creates a finite additional distortion on the margin and is therefore
socially inefficient. To motivate the choice of taxes and transfers, we think of the
government as maximizing the welfare of the favored group. The government’s
choice of transfers depends on the nature of the tax base. If members of the favored
group “own” a pro-rata share of the tax base, we get a variant of Mancur Olson’s
9 The budget constraint can alternatively be written (Nf 3 T) 1 (N 3 I) 5 t(N*B(t)), where Nf
is the number of individuals in the favored group and N is the total population. Divide by N to get the
equation in the text, with f 5 Nf/N.
10 Important portions of the tax base may not enter the fiscal accounts explicitly: for example, tB(t)
would include the inflation tax (the inflation rate multiplied by the real monetary base) and, in the
presence of a foreign exchange black market, any implicit surplus gained by the central bank via net
purchases of foreign exchange at the overvalued official exchange rate.
11 This simplifies the exposition without changing anything of substance; see McGuire and Olson (1996)
for an analysis with endogenous infrastructure.
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(1982) “encompassing interests” paradigm (applied here to authoritarian regimes,
rather than, as Olson did, to the social democracies of postwar Europe). A govern-
ment with fully encompassing preferences—in fact, even one in which f is “suffi-
ciently” large, but below one—will completely forego transfers.12 In effect, the
favored group chooses to benefit over time from overall economic growth (Boone,
1996; McGuire and Olson, 1996). However, narrower power structures will gener-
ate larger transfers and slower growth. Elites with support in dynamic sectors will
produce better growth outcomes, other things equal, since they will tend to support
such sectors.
The analysis accommodates features of African economic policy that were
emphasized in the Berg Report—in particular, heavy discrimination against agri-
culture and international trade, and widespread use of direct controls in prefer-
ence to price interventions. In his classic discussion of African agricultural policy
and urban bias, Bates (1981) argues that since peasants were excluded from the
favored group and the administrative cost of taxing external trade was low, transfers
from export agriculture were often large. By the early 1980s, many African coun-
tries had lost market share in key agricultural commodities, and in many cases the
tax base had shrunken still further, reflecting the diversion of trade into illegal
channels. Where leaders had important political roots in smallholder agricul-
ture—as did Kenya’s Kenyatta, Coˆte d’Ivoire’s Houghouet-Boigny, and Botswana’s
Khama and Masire—policy towards agriculture was more favorable and export
performance in this sector fared better. The demonstrated preferences for quan-
titative restrictions and licensing over price-based interventions makes sense be-
cause it is easier to target the benefits of quantitative restrictions to favored parties.
The interest-based approach has obvious difficulty explaining why the leading
group should pursue economic policies that lead to outright stagnation or decline.
But dramatically inefficient outcomes are possible if the political structure gives
leaders a high discount rate (for example, Olson, 1982; Levi, 1988). For example,
a high probability of a coup d’e´tat reduces the incentives to enact policies that will
support a larger future tax base—since the current leadership may no longer be in
control at that time.13 This effect can be especially strong when institutional
12 To see this, consider an initial tax rate that is just sufficient to finance the socially optimal level of
infrastructure, so that transfers are initially zero. The cost to each member of the favored group of
financing a dollar of transfers via higher taxation is then f 3 (1 1 MDWL), where MDWL is the
marginal deadweight loss from taxation, which is strictly positive because distortionary taxes are already
being used to finance infrastructure. The benefit to each member of the favored group is 1/f, which
exceeds 1 because of the concentration of transfer income into the hands of a group that is smaller than
the overall population. Comparing marginal cost with marginal benefit, it is clear that there is some
value of f, strictly below 1, for which the concentrated benefit of the transfer is not sufficient to offset
the favored group’s pro rata share in the social cost of taxation. Any government with f exceeding this
level chooses zero transfers.
13 If we think of the government as setting tomorrow’s tax rate today, then the possibility of having
power (and revenues) captured by an opposition group simply replaces fT in the display equation with
pfT, where p is the probability of remaining in power. Under these conditions an exogenous increase
in contestibility is equivalent to a reduction in f.
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restraints are absent, so that leaders are known to have wide discretion over tax
policy. In this case, moderate tax rates are supported only by the incentives of
leaders to maintain a reputation for moderate tax rates—an incentive that weakens
with increases in the discount rate. Recognizing the short time horizon of policy-
makers and the likelihood that the tax rate will be punitively high, private investors
move away from investment in the taxed activity; faced with a weak tax base, leaders
then choose very high tax rates, in a self-confirming equilibrium. Along these lines,
McMillan (1998) shows that an increase in the frequency of executive transitions in
African nations increases the probability that export tax rates will be pushed to the
wrong side of the Laffer curve—as in Ghana in the late 1970s when the taxation of
cocoa clearly exceeded revenue-maximizing rates (Leith and Lofchie, 1993).14 The
broader point is simple: if the favored group cannot commit to limit its extraction
of rents in the future, its current incentives shift from sustaining growth to extract-
ing transfers.
The interest-based approach had both comforting and unsettling implications
for the economic policy reforms that got underway in the 1980s. On the positive
side, while external aid donors defended market-based structural reforms primarily
on supply-side grounds, they also expected trade and exchange rate reforms and
the loosening of state controls over agricultural marketing to unwind the urban
bias of existing policies. Since Africa’s poor are overwhelmingly engaged in agri-
culture, this meant that the distributional impact of structural adjustment would be
favorable. The available evidence, while limited, favors this interpretation (Sahn,
1996). On the negative side, however, these reforms were likely to fail if the existing
urban bias represented a political equilibrium. Urban groups would block reforms
to protect existing distributional patterns—as in Zambia, where riots hastened the
reversal of fiscal and exchange rate reforms in the late 1980s. Moreover, lingering
uncertainty about the political viability of such reforms would undermine the
private sector’s supply response, as potential investors waited for uncertainty to be
resolved before making commitments. Aryeetey (1994) views low credibility of
reform as a central reason for the poor investment response to sustained reform in
Ghana (see also Oyejide et al., 1997).
In retrospect, the interest-based interpretation of urban bias appears to apply
more powerfully to understanding the fitful pace of reforms and the prevalence of
policy reversals than it does to why the policies of urban bias were originally
adopted (Mkandawire and Soludo, 1999). In many cases, the relevant urban
interests—including the public enterprise sector, the civil service, and the large
urban informal sector—were mainly a post-independence creation. These interests
came to constrain the state in its ability to adjust to economic shocks, but in contrast
with the military in some cases, it is not clear that they were forces to be reckoned
with at the time of independence.
14 Evidence on the inflation tax (defined in note 10) suggests that these examples could be multiplied:
Adam, Ndulu and Sowa (1996), for example, find that inflation exceeded revenue-maximizing rates on
a sustained basis in Ghana and Tanzania in the 1980s.
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The Weak State
“[T]he coercive monolithism of most African political systems,” writes Ake
(1996, p. 69), “readily gives the impression of strong states with immense penetra-
tive capacity, states which are everywhere doing everything. Yet African states are
actually very weak.” The argument is that while the neopatrimonial state is super-
ficially powerful, it is too weak to support sustained growth. Its internal limitations
distinguish it from the “rational-legal” state, which is equally authoritarian but
creates a supportive environment for growth. This line of argument emphasizes
that bureaucratic corruption, policy-generated uncertainty, and predatory behavior
of a state will tend to raise transactions costs for private actors.
Consider bureaucratic corruption first. The interest group approach tends to
gloss over the actual machinery of government, as if the favored group, having
captured the policy process, could delegate the task of rent extraction to a well-
functioning bureaucracy. But this requires that the political elite exercise tight
control over the bureaucratic apparatus. If, instead, corruption is decentralized,
with individual state employees each operating independently, the cumulative tax
on private activity can well be prohibitive. Moreover, since corruption builds on
itself, regimes subject to decentralized corruption may also be particularly vulner-
able to shocks that increase the incentives for rent extraction by individual employ-
ees. Vishny and Shleifer (1990) argue along these lines in interpreting bureaucratic
corruption as a tax on private capital accumulation. In fact, the widespread use of
state employment as a patronage mechanism in Africa, along with the absence of a
bureaucratic tradition, meant that in many cases employees were hired with a tacit
acceptance that they would use their positions to meet patronage obligations of
their own.
As a second example of state-generated transactions costs, consider the uncer-
tainties associated with shifting patron-client links in neopatrimonial regimes. Van
de Walle (1994) observes that neopatrimonial regimes have been characterized by
“factional infighting and alliance switching . . . even when [rulers] remain in power
for long periods of time. Achebe (1988, p. 41) described the same problem in more
picturesque terms in Anthills of the Savannah: “Worshipping a dictator . . . wouldn’t
be so bad if it was merely a matter of dancing upside down on your head. With
practice anyone could learn to do that. The real problem is having no way of
knowing from one day to another, from one minute to the next, just what is up and
what is down.” Van de Walle characterizes these manipulations as ways of limiting
the ability of competing elites to coalesce in opposition to the incumbent. Their
effect, however, is to undermine the coherence of public management in the short
run and to increase uncertainty about the nature and timing of executive transi-
tions. As argued in the previous section, a greater degree of uncertainty—in this
case, over which regional or sectoral interest will control the regime in the near
future—will discourage long-run investment in all sectors.
Consider finally a disturbing insight of Robinson (1997a, b) regarding what he
calls “predation.” Suppose that government policies that produce rapid economic
development—like the provision of public infrastructure—also reduce the costs of
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collective action by the political opposition. Rapid development then increases political
contestibility. Leaders may then oppose development as a way of tightening their grip
on power.15 This view makes some sense of “non-development dictatorships” like those
of President Mobutu in Zaire, Idi Amin in Uganda, or Sani Abacha in Nigeria. But its
potential applicability is wider. For example, in a pattern consistent with Robinson’s
interpretation, African states have in some cases nurtured a more productive relation-
ship with politically excluded domestic capital (like Kenyans of Asian descent) than
with indigenous capital which might pose a greater political risk. More generally, the
approach helps to explain why many African governments continue to view the private
sector with lingering suspicion—because it may serve as an alternative political power
base (Mkandawire and Soludo, 1999). The political potency of private wealth was
brought home to Nigeria’s military leaders in 1993 when Moshood Abiola, a wealthy
private businessman, swept a democratic presidential election. The election was an-
nulled and it was not until after Abiola’s death under house arrest that the military
opened room for new elections in 1999. Finally, one can apply Robinson’s analysis to
the transition to one-party rule. We emphasized earlier that Africa’s first-generation
leaders sought to deny the leverage of mass political participation to contesting elites.
Limitations of Foreign Aid
These observations on the characteristics of the neopatrimonial state suggest
that the three pieces of Adam Smith’s triumvirate—peace, easy taxes, and tolerable
administration of justice—are mutually reinforcing, so that where history or poverty
puts one or more out of easy reach, the others become more costly. In such a
situation, the scope for effective foreign assistance seems wide. For example, an
untied inflow of aid might enhance growth by allowing a reduction in distortionary
taxation; for a sufficiently encompassing government, this is what the model
predicts (Boone, 1996). A similar effect would emerge if aid could directly finance
increases in spending on public infrastructure like roads and agricultural research.
If the problem is that government has too short a time horizon, outside donors with
longer perspectives may serve as external monitors; indeed, the conditionality
packages of the 1980s seemed designed with this idea in mind. If public sector
15 In a game-theoretic extension in the style of the Olson and Bates analysis, Robinson (1997a) argues
that a more encompassing elite (a government with larger f ) may actually be less likely to choose
developmental policies, rather than more likely. The reason is that an elite with wide claims on GDP
presents a more attractive target for overthrow than one with narrow claims. Faced with a larger “prize,”
members of the opposition have a greater incentive to engage in collective action. In this view, President
Mobutu opposed Zairian development not because his discount rate was high or preferences overly
narrow, but because development raised the threat of political demise and the loss of his substantial
claim on GDP. This conclusion requires certain underlying assumptions; for example, that the growth
in the economy primarily threatens a broader elite, rather than giving them greater strength to resist the
loss of power. Ongoing work in this area is likely to deliver many insights.
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management were the issue, donors could design technical assistance packages that
built or transferred expertise in this area.
Yet a view is emerging in the empirical and case study literature that aid has
had a limited effect on policy outcomes in Africa and that its contribution to growth
has been heavily conditioned by the pre-existing quality of the institutional and
policy environment (for example, World Bank, 1998). In 1996, the African gover-
nors of the World Bank went further, arguing that aid was on balance undermining
institutional capacity in Africa (cited in van de Walle, 1998).
If one considers the politics of the global aid regime, these conclusions are not
surprising.16 Bilateral aid is first and foremost an instrument of foreign policy. In
Africa during the Cold War, the geopolitical interests of major donors centered on
the support of political or ideological clients rather than on rapid economic
development. Until the late 1980s, since donors were divided and in some cases in
direct competition for clients, they could be played one against the other. For these
reasons, donor pressure at that time was poorly suited to push for better economic
policy or for a transition from authoritarian rule to greater pluralism.
In this setting, a rise in unconditional aid will often simply increase transfers to
the favored groups (Adam and O’Connell, 1999). Aid does not directly reduce
growth in these cases, but it will have little impact on reducing policy distortions,
either. Indeed, to the degree that aid flows enhance the domestic competition for
politically motivated transfers and the power to dispense them, they may reinforce
neopatrimonial patterns.
As donors coalesced around market-based reforms in the 1980s and early 1990s,
they confronted the reality that reforms would generally be implemented by incum-
bent political leaders, and that even in the best of cases—where leaders were ready to
embrace reform—domestic constituencies in favor of reform were not likely to emerge
rapidly. It would therefore take a strong state to weather the political battle of reducing
state controls. Ake (1996) argues that this placed donors in the position of supporting,
at least implicitly, a tightening of authoritarian rule in Africa. Aid increased rapidly in
the 1980s, as donors shifted to quick-disbursing balance-of-payments support that
would soften the impact of reforms on overall spending and allow leaders some
leverage to buy off domestic opposition. At some 15 percent of GDP, the median
African country was receiving by the early 1990s roughly six times the amount of
American aid delivered annually to western Europe under the Marshall Plan
(O’Connell and Soludo, 1999). But the growth response to reforms was weak. Ake
(1996), Gordon (1993) and others argue that the most fundamental effect of condi-
tional aid in the 1980s was an unexpected one: by creating political turmoil and little
perceived gain, it tended to undermine the narrow legitimacy of autocratic rulers and
hasten the emergence of mass protest in the late 1980s.
16 They are however, controversial. If aid goes to the poorest countries that appear in greatest need, a
finding that higher aid levels produce little growth may involve reverse causality.
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Flexibility, Restraint and External Shocks
Governance affects long-term growth not only through policy distortions and
transactions costs, but also via the capacity to handle external economic shocks as
they occur. The institutional framework through which African countries encoun-
tered shocks to commodity markets in the 1970s and to world financial markets in
the early 1980s had already evolved substantially since independence. We have
stressed the expansion of the public sector’s role in the economy, the subordina-
tion of “agencies of restraint,” and the narrowing of public debate over economic
policy. At the same time, a tendency to over-tax potentially dynamic sectors and a
heavy reliance on revenues to service patron-client networks had created vulnera-
bilities in many countries in terms of fiscal positions and the balance of payments.
In some cases, these vulnerabilities were heightened by social conflict. For all of
these reasons, African countries were not well-placed to handle the macroeconomic
shocks of the 1970s and 1980s.
Rodrik (1998) develops a unified view of external shocks and distributional
conflict that fits well with the themes we have developed above. Consider, for
example, the burden-sharing problem generated by a collapse in the terms of trade.
Efficient adjustment requires that resources be reallocated to minimize the decline
in permanent income, and that total spending decline accordingly. Rodrik argues
that the willingness of domestic groups to accommodate such efficiency-based
responses depends on beliefs about how conflicting claims will work themselves
out. If the political system is believed to reward pressing aggressive claims on
resources, then everyone will make such claims, and a tangle of mutually incom-
patible claims will paralyze effective policy action and exacerbate aggregate losses.
What matters in the end, in this view, is the strength and independence of policy
institutions relative to latent social conflicts. Countries with strong institutions
relative to latent conflicts will adjust more successfully to an adverse shock than
those with weak institutions and/or substantial latent conflicts.
Rodrik’s (1998) framework has immediate appeal in thinking about how
African countries have responded to commodity price fluctuations. For an undi-
versified commodity exporter, standard principles suggest a conservative response
to price booms (including the accumulation of foreign assets) and a decisive
response to price declines of any duration, via currency devaluation, reductions in
government spending, and real wage declines. Botswana, for example, followed this
pattern closely in responding to fluctuations in oil and diamond prices on the
world market (Hill and Mokgethi, 1989). The more typical African pattern, how-
ever, has involved rapid increases in government spending during booms, and
persistent fiscal deficits with exchange rate overvaluation in periods of decline
(Bevan et al. 1989, 1990; Deaton, this issue; Wheeler, 1984). This pattern is
consistent with powerful demands on state resources to service patron-client net-
works. When times are good, the system avoids crisis and may even appear to thrive,
but overspending and debt accumulation increase its vulnerability to a reversal of
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fortunes. When the situation deteriorates, the combination of weak institutions and
severe vulnerability produces a crisis.
A similar argument based in distributional conflict can help to explain the delay
and frequent reversal of African trade policy reforms during the 1980s. While the aim
of trade liberalization is to raise national income, standard general equilibrium theory
suggests that in the short run, the distributional consequences of such changes are
much larger than the net efficiency gains (Rodrik, 1998). Moreover, the losers from
trade liberalization—mainly urban firms and workers—were better organized politi-
cally than the primarily rural exporters. How did Africa’s strong economic performers
manage to avoid such trade policy problems?17 In Botswana, the absence of excessive
taxation of agricultural exports owed much to the strong rural background of its
political leadership (Harvey and Lewis, 1990). On the import side, Botswana retained
its participation in the South African Customs Union after independence. This re-
moved the government’s discretion over trade policy, which was controlled by South
Africa, and thereby eliminated a major avenue for domestic conflict over resources. In
Mauritius, the government managed to develop an export-processing zone without
undermining the interests of the powerful import-substituting lobby. The export-
processing zone mainly employed women, paying them lower wages in an enclave
system, and did not challenge the interests of the male-dominated labor force in
import-substituting industries.
The example of Mauritius underlines the value of political entrepreneurship,
which in turn points to a continuing conundrum in African governance: To what
degree, and in what ways, should the discretion of policymakers be limited? Tight
policy restraints are not uniformly appealing, even in normal times. The govern-
ment of Botswana, for example, retained its membership in the South African
Customs Union while going in the other direction with respect to monetary policy.
By leaving the Rand Monetary Area in 1974 and introducing its own, independent
currency, Botswana risked the syndrome of high inflation, exchange controls, and
black markets that was common outside of the “CFA zone,” those countries which
had continued to peg their currencies to the French franc. But the Central Bank of
Botswana subsequently achieved lower inflation under a discretionary regime than
did the Reserve Bank of South Africa.
In times of crisis, in fact, the general interest may well require the exercise of
flexibility, making a failure to suspend restraining mechanisms a sign of weak gover-
nance. The countries of the CFA zone provide a clear example. Unlike the rest of
Africa, twelve of France’s 13 former colonies in West and Central Africa retained
colonial monetary arrangements after the transition to independence.18 These coun-
17 We draw here on Rodrik’s (1997) discussion of trade policy in Africa.
18 The initials CFA refer to the currencies issued by the two central banks of the zone. The Central Bank
of the West African States—which includes Benin, Burkina Faso, Coˆte d’Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and
Togo—issues the franc of the Communaute´ financie`re d’Afrique. The Central Bank of the Central
African States—which includes Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea,
and Gabon—issues the franc of the Coope´ration financie`re en Afrique centrale. See Neurrisse (1987).
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tries were grouped into two monetary unions (and later joined by Equatorial Guinea,
a former Spanish colony), the governance of which was transferred to the African
members in the mid-1970s. The two currencies remained tied to the French franc at
parities established in 1948, and convertibility continued to be guaranteed by the
French Treasury. The French government therefore wielded substantial influence over
monetary and exchange rate policy in the zone. The CFA zone arrangement was a
powerful agency of monetary restraint: inflation in the zone was a third of that in the
rest of Africa and free capital mobility prevented the emergence of currency black
markets that were a standard feature of African experience outside of the zone.
Within Africa, the CFA countries tended to grow more rapidly than countries
outside the zone through the late 1970s. However, the beneficent macroeconomic
effect of zone membership reversed itself by the mid-1980s, as countries outside of the
zone, under pressure from external donors and the collapse of their own exchange
control regimes, implemented currency devaluations. Within the CFA zone, overvalu-
ation was initially milder, but devaluation was delayed until 1994. In the meantime, the
adjustment to external shocks was highly contractionary. In Coˆte d’Ivoire, one of
Africa’s stellar performers between 1960 and 1980 with annual per capita growth of
4.1 percent, real GDP per capita declined at the (same) rate of 4.1 percent during
1980–92, leaving income barely higher in 1992 than it had been 30 years earlier. In
Cameroon, an oil-exporting country, contraction was delayed until the mid-1980s,
when a combination of weak oil prices and an appreciating French franc created an
unsustainable external trade balance. In both Coˆte d’Ivoire and Cameroon, sufficient
domestic deflation could have achieved the required real depreciation, but this process
was slow. Outside of the CFA zone, exchange rate devaluations were initially resisted,
but they finally proved invaluable in inducing urban interests (trade unions and public
sector employees) to accept lower real incomes.
This analysis, rooted in issues of distributional conflict, is not inconsistent with
arguments often used by African leaders in rationalizing the prevalence of author-
itarian rule. When institutions are initially weak, multiple equilibria exist. Rival
groups may choose to act opportunistically if they believe others will do so, but
cooperatively if they believe others will. In this setting, political leaders have two
ways of reducing the economy’s vulnerability to adverse outcomes: they can
strengthen institutions or they can work directly on beliefs. Strengthening institu-
tions might involve adopting colonial-style monetary arrangements with their tight
restrictions on deficit finance or ensuring the representation of diverse views in the
political process. Working on beliefs means trying to create an environment for a
cooperative equilibrium to emerge. Presumably leaders will do both—unless the
two approaches conflict. One optimistic way of interpreting the weakening of
agencies of restraint and pluralist political institutions early in the independence
period is as an attempt to submerge social conflicts in the idea of the nation, so that
a cooperative equilibrium was more likely to emerge. We have emphasized the
fundamental weaknesses of this approach when applied at the national scale. But
our criticisms should not obscure the objective and continuing necessity for strong
leadership when institutions are initially weak and latent conflicts strong. If pluralist
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political institutions are to survive and prosper in Africa they will have to address
the central weaknesses of neopatrimonial regimes while simultaneously affording
wide scope for political leadership.
Conclusion
African elites engineered a transition to one-party rule early in the post-
independence period, promising stability and economic development in return for
a monopoly on political power. The tenor of that time was summarized by Kwame
Nkrumah, the great pan-Africanist and first President of Ghana, with this phrase:
“Seek ye first the political kingdom, and all the rest shall be added unto ye.”
Nkrumah’s statement is often quoted ironically, against the backdrop of his au-
thoritarian style, his removal by coup in 1966, and Ghana’s precipitous economic
decline. But a serious puzzle arises here, and one that is not specific to Ghana.
Having achieved the political kingdom, why did so many governments fail to
internalize the general interest in capital accumulation and growth?
One answer is that governments were captive to the wrong interests; for example,
giving too little weight to peasant agriculture and too much to urban interests. But
while this insight illuminates the political constraints on policy reform, the groups that
came to constrain policy reform in the 1980s were in many cases more a creation of
policy choices than a source. In choosing state-led and inward-looking industrialization,
Africa’s first generation of leaders were captive to ideas rather than interests.
Our central argument has instead been that Africa’s growth record reflects a
groping towards satisfactory modes of national governance under objectively diffi-
cult circumstances. Among these circumstances we emphasize particularly the
shock of political independence. In most countries, neither the state, operating at
a national scale, nor private domestic capital—the two entities whose evolving
relationship dominates contemporary discussions of governance—existed in a
meaningful sense at the time of independence. In the 1960s and early 1970s, new
African governments faced strong pressure to repudiate any outward-oriented or
restraining elements of the colonial institutional inheritance. Those narrow inter-
ests that would seem at the time to have been most aligned with capital accumu-
lation and growth were most tainted by their close association with the colonial
experience. The development ethos of that day emphasized state-led industrializa-
tion, and together with plausible appeals for national unity and political stability,
this was taken to justify authoritarian rule.
Economic growth was adequate through the early 1970s, but policy distortions
and structural weaknesses in the public sector had already undermined the fiscal
and balance of payments position when the shocks of the 1970s and early 1980s
arrived. By the early 1980s, relations between government elites and their external
patrons had soured. From that point forward, donors sought reforms that would
both address macroeconomic imbalances and reduce the government’s role in the
economy. However, since donors paid for reforms, Africa’s governments and
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citizens did not own them (Collier, 1991). Most African countries had no sustained
period between 1960 and 1988 during which broad public debates exercised
serious influence over national policy. Internal movements for democracy gathered
strength in the late 1980s as Africa’s relative economic performance deteriorated
further, and by 1994 the possibilities for pluralist politics had been transformed
through a combination of internal and external pressure.
Looking ahead, we see a widening scope for positive interactions between politics
and economic performance in Africa. Africa’s democratization in the 1990s is different
in character from the democratization that accompanied the run-up to independence.
As a response to the manifest failings of autocratic regimes, and buttressed by an
international environment that has narrowed the terms of economic policy debate, it
holds out the prospect of a more fundamental creation of a participatory state than
occurred at independence. Where political instability continues or the interests of the
military and other privileged classes cannot be accommodated within a pluralist
regime, economic gains may well be negligible or reversed; in our view, a lack of
political pluralism will undermine governance and growth. But where political free-
doms remain, the constraints they impose on government predation will enhance the
environment for capital accumulation and growth. External donors can play a crucial
role, but the task is not their own. They will misuse their newfound post-Cold War unity
if they deny African populations and their political leaders the ability to set their own
national agenda. There are no easy ways forward. However, Africa’s first generation of
independence has set the stage for an ongoing, if sometimes halting, move toward
greater democratization and economic growth.
y We thank Ernest Aryeetey, Thomas Callaghy, Robert Inman, Smita Singh, Nicolas van de
Walle, and participants in the JEP Workshop on African Growth Performance for helpful
discussions, and Kirran Bari for excellent research assistance. The detailed suggestions of Alan
Krueger, Brad De Long, Jonathan Morduch, Donald O’Connell, Charles Soludo, Timothy Taylor,
and Larry Westphal substantially improved the paper. Susan Collins generously supplied us with
data from Collins and Bosworth (1996). The views expressed here are solely those of the authors.
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Correction
Governance and Growth in Sub-Saharan
Africa
Benno J. Ndulu and Stephen A. O’Connell
Tables 1 and 2 in our article on African governance and growth, which
appeared in the Summer 1999 issue of the Journal of Economic Perspectives (13:3, pp.
41–66) contain errors that led us to overstate the extent of Africa’s growth shortfall
and the contribution of slow productivity growth. The African aggregates are
measured correctly in these tables; errors pertain to “other developing countries”
and are the result of our having transposed some rows in an underlying spread-
sheet. The correct data, which should replace the corresponding entries in Tables
1 and 2, appear below.
Comparing these with the African aggregates as they appear in Tables 1 and 2
of the original paper (pp. 45–46), Africa’s average growth shortfall from 1960 to
1994 was 1.7 percentage points on an annual basis, rather than the 2.5 percentage
points reported in the original text (p. 43). Slower growth in the residual accounts
for just over half of this shortfall, rather than two-thirds (as claimed on p. 44). Since
the corrected shortfall is now close to what one obtains using PPP-adjusted real
incomes (as reported on p. 42 and illustrated in Figure 2), footnote 1 in our
original text, which “explains away” the apparent discrepancy, is irrelevant except
as a testimonial to our powers of rationalization(!).
These errors are large by the standards of growth accounting, and they feed
what is already in the literature a very negative view of African growth performance.
We are grateful for the opportunity to correct them in print. Our basic messages,
however, are robust to these corrections. Africa’s growth shortfall has indeed been
large, and slow productivity growth has been a very important contributor. These
y Benno J. Ndulu is Lead Economist, World Bank Resident Mission, Dar es Salaam,
Tanzania. Stephen A. O’Connell is Professor of Economics, Swarthmore College, Swarthmore,
Pennsylvania. Both authors are Research Associates of the Centre for Study of African
Economies, University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom.
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observations represent central challenges for researchers in growth and develop-
ment. We argue in the paper that the study of governance represents one prom-
ising focus for coming to terms with them—and that developments now underway
in many African countries hold the promise of making them irrelevant.
Table 1
Growth Decompositions: Unweighted Averages
Period







45 other developing countries
1960–94 2.07 1.19 0.39 0.46
1960–73 3.14 1.44 0.33 1.34
1973–94 1.42 1.04 0.44 20.07
Table 2
Growth Decompositions: Unweighted Standard Deviations
Period







45 other developing countries
1960–94 1.84 0.87 0.14 1.20
1960–73 1.64 1.05 0.20 1.04
1973–94 2.48 0.96 0.18 1.82
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